Opinion: Biden and Co. need realistic assessment of India's strategy

In the past two decades, Washington has bet a lot on the Indo-Pacific -- that treating India as a key partner will help with its geopolitical rivalry with China. Successive US heads of state have bolstered India's defence capabilities assuming that it would naturally strengthen Asia’s "forces of freedom".

President Joe Biden's administration has enthusiastically embraced this strategy. This administration has taken it to the next level by launching a new initiative aimed at expanding India's access to cutting-edge technologies, enhancing defence cooperation and making the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) -- which includes Australia, India, Japan and the US -- a key component of its regional strategy. All of this has been done under the assumption that New Delhi will respond favourably to a request from Washington during a regional crisis involving China.

Currently, Washington’s expectations of India are unrealistic. Due to its significant weak points in comparison to China and its inescapable proximity to that nation, New Delhi will not get involved in any US conflict with Beijing without direct security implications. Cooperation with Washington is valued by India because of its tangible benefits, but it does not believe it must materially support Washington in a crisis involving such a common threat as China.

Ultimately, there is a fundamental conflict between the US and India regarding their security partnership. In similar fashion as with its allies across the world, Washington has worked to elevate India’s standing within the liberal international order and, when necessary, sought its contributions to coalition defence efforts.

Despite this, New Delhi sees things differently. Maintaining the liberal international order will not be of any interest to it and it remains averse to sharing defence obligations. It seeks to acquire advanced technologies from the US to strengthen its own economic and military capabilities, thereby enabling its rise as a great power capable of balancing China independently, but it does not assume that American assistance imposes any further obligations on itself.

The Biden administration must keep in mind a realistic assessment of Indian strategy when expanding its investment in India and not repose much faith in New Delhi becoming a comrade-in-arms during a future crisis.

Reviewing Strategic Goals

India and the US did not engage in any serious discussions about national defence during the Cold War, as New Delhi did not want to join either the Soviet or the American bloc. Security relations between the two countries blossomed only after Bush offered India a transformative nuclear deal.

Those breakthroughs have led to a remarkable level of intensity and scope in US-Indian security cooperation today. There is regular dialogue between the two countries’ civilian leaders and bureaucracies on a variety of topics -- including China policy, India’s procurement of advanced US military technologies, maritime surveillance and undersea warfare equipment. 

As these conversations vary in quality and depth, they play an essential role in reviewing strategic assessments, defining the parameters of desired cooperation and designing tools for policy implementation. In the Indo-Pacific region, for instance, the two countries cooperate to monitor China’s economic and military activities and recently invested in mechanisms for sharing near-real-time information about shipping movements.

Second, military-to-military collaboration has been successful -- much of it out of public sight. Recent decades have seen a dramatic expansion in senior officers' visits, bilateral or multilateral military exercises and reciprocal military training programmes. This expanded relationship is exemplified by high-profile exercises. The Malabar exercises, which bring the US and Indian navies together every year, have expanded permanently to include Japan and Australia, as well. 

As part of the Cope India exercises -- a series of international exercises between the US and Indian air forces held on Indian soil and in its skies to foster mutual understanding and share best practices -- the two air forces practise advanced air operations. And, as part of Yudh Abhyas, the land forces conduct command post and field training exercises.

Finally, American firms have been successful in penetrating the Indian defence market. Two decades ago, India’s military had virtually no American weapons. But today, it has US transport and maritime aircraft, utility and combat helicopters and anti-ship missiles and artillery. Defence trade between the US and India, earlier negligible, reached over $20 billion in 2020.

The era of major US platform acquisitions has probably ended. While American companies remain competitive in several Indian procurement programmes, it seems doubtful that they will ever enjoy a dominant market share in India’s defence imports. The problems are entirely structural in nature. 

Despite India's increasing security threats, its defence procurement budget remains modest in comparison with Western markets. India's elected governments have not increased defence expenditures in a way that may allow the US to vastly expand its military acquisitions.

As a result of the advanced technology used in US defence systems, the cost of these systems is, generally, higher than those of other suppliers, making the US defence industry less attractive to India. The small Indian defence market makes New Delhi's demand that US companies produce equipment with local partners in India -- requiring intellectual property transfers -- commercially unattractive.

India Walks the Lone Path

Although Indo-US security cooperation has enjoyed marked success, the larger defence partnership still faces significant challenges. Despite their growing ties, both nations differ significantly in how they intend to limit China’s assertiveness and hegemonistic aspirations.

As part of coalition warfare, the Pentagon aims for interoperability in military-to-military cooperation, where foreign military forces should be able to participate in combined operations. However, India rejects the idea that its military will participate in any combined military operation outside UN-authorized ones. 

As a result, it has desisted from investing in meaningful operational integration, especially with the US armed forces, as it does not want to lose its autonomy in geopolitics or show any signs of a shift towards a stronger political collaboration with Washington. Thus, although the bilateral military exercises enhance tactical proficiency of the units involved, they do not expand interoperability to the level that would be required in major combined operations.

Military cooperation represents another challenge for India, which underscores cultivating diverse international ties. As a result, India practises with many partners at varying levels of sophistication to increase operational proficiency, rather than as political symbols, while the US emphasises relatively intense military exercises with a smaller set of partners.

It has been India’s priority to receive American assistance in building up its own national capabilities to confront threats on its own. In this regard, both sides have made progress, for instance by bolstering India’s intelligence capabilities regarding Chinese military activities along the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean. There are formal arrangements for intelligence-sharing and New Delhi does share what it considers useful. The US collection capabilities are so superior, however, that it often results in a one-way information flow.

Defence Industrial Coop

India's security partnership with the US has increasingly focused on defence industrial cooperation under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As a modern state, India has always sought to master all critical defence, dual-use and civilian technologies and, in order to do so, built up large public sector firms that were intended to be global leaders. 

The underlying objective is to secure technological autonomy. In order to realize this dream, New Delhi has prioritized Washington’s support for its defence industrial ambitions in tandem with similar partnerships with France, Israel, Russia and other friendly nations.

It has been over a decade since Washington has attempted to help India improve its defence technology base. Under the Obama Administration, the two countries launched the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative, which promoted technology exchange and co-production of defence systems. 

They envision the initiative as enabling them to acquire advanced US military technologies—such as jet engines, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and stealth capabilities—so that they can manufacture, or co-develop them there. As Washington hesitated to clear such transfers, US defence firms resisted releasing their intellectual property or making commercial investments for meagre returns.

Washington’s Big Bet

Attempts are now being made by the Biden Administration to reverse the failure of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. An Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies was announced last year, which aims at transforming cooperation between the governments, businesses and research entities of the two countries. 

A wide range of fields is involved in this endeavour—such as semiconductors, space, artificial intelligence, next-generation telecommunications, high-performance computing and quantum technologies.

Despite its potential, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology cannot guarantee any specific results. Since many joint ventures require licences, the US government can make, or break, the initiative. Although the Biden administration seems inclined to be more liberal on this compared to its predecessors, it is unclear whether the initiative will deliver on India’s aspirations for greater access to advanced US technology. 

As a part of Modi's 'Make in India, Make for World' initiative, which aims at transforming India into a world-class manufacturing hub capable of competing with, or even replacing, China one day, India will become the world’s workshop.

It remains to be seen if Washington’s generosity towards India contributes to its strategic objectives. US ambitions during the Bush and Obama administrations were focused primarily on bolstering India’s power to prevent China from dominating Asia. US-China relations steadily deteriorated during the Trump Administration -- when Sino-Indian relations also hit rock bottom -- and Washington began to think that its support for New Delhi would gradually encourage India to play a larger military role in containing China’s growing influence.

An Unlikely Bonhomie

This is not likely to happen. India has demonstrated a willingness to join the US and its Quad partners in some low-politics areas -- such as vaccine distribution, infrastructure investment and supply chain diversification -- even as it insists that none of these initiatives is directed against China. 

While India is likely to refuse to play a role in situations where its own security is not directly threatened by Chinese aggression, the most burdensome challenge Washington faces in the Indo-Pacific is to secure meaningful military contributions to defeat the threat of Chinese aggression. 

It is possible that New Delhi will only offer tacit support during such circumstances. In spite of China being India’s most intimidating adversary, New Delhi still wants to avoid irreparably damaging its relationship with that country. Indian policymakers are acutely aware of the vast disparities in national power between China and India. 

New Delhi is not in a strong enough position so that it can provoke it neighbour and joining forces with the US in any military campaign against China certainly would ruffle a lot of feathers in Beijing. It is also impossible for India to escape its physical proximity to China. Having a long border with India, Beijing can significantly threaten Indian security -- a capability that has only grown over time.

The Indo-US partnership will be fundamentally asymmetrical for a long time to come. In seeking American support in its own confrontation with China, New Delhi intends to stay away from any US-China confrontation that does not directly affect its own interests. However, there is no doubt that India would wish for the US to prevail in any major conflict between Washington and Beijing in East Asia or the South China Sea.

Thus, strengthening defence ties between Delhi and Washington must not be interpreted as either supporting the liberal international order or participating in collective defence efforts against China. Policymakers in India see the intensifying security relationship as a means to boost India’s own national defence capabilities without obligated support for other global crises. Despite the rapid expansion of the partnership, India has avoided becoming the junior partner -- or even a confederate -- of any great power.

There is no doubt that the US will assist India to the extent that is compatible with its interests. No matter how generous its support, it should not expect India to join any military coalition against China as a result of its support. India’s relationship with the US differs fundamentally from the relationship with its allies. The present US dispensation would certainly do well to appreciate this reality rather than try to change it.